Flipping for Trump: Immigration, Not Economics, Explains Shifts in White Working Class Votes

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Abstract

The voting habits of the white working class (WWC) were highlighted in the aftermath of Trump's electoral college victory. One untested proposition is that Trump's unorthodox candidacy "flipped" enough WWC voters who either did not vote, or did not vote Republican, prior to 2016. Theories of racial realignment, however, suggest stable party coalitions make cross-party vote switching rare. Theories of racial backlash, by contrast, point to polarization over demographic change and Trump's anti-immigrant appeals as catalysts for partisan reshuffling. More sanguine interpretations argue economic dislocation and marginality were the main sources of any flipping for Trump in 2016. We test these expectations and find clear evidence for immigrant backlash explanations, with WWC voters with negative immigrant attitudes most likely to switch to Trump and those with positive immigrant attitudes most likely to switch to Clinton. Our findings suggest that immigration is further sorting the WWC into new partisan camps.

"I went and finally signed up for Medicaid, and I'm standing in the damn welfare office, and I'm looking around at all of these people that can't even say hello to me in English. But they're all there with appointments for their workers, which means they have the health care, they have the food stamps...If you can come from somewhere else, why can't we all get it?"

— Anonymous Trump Voter, Macomb County 2017, Democracy Corps focus group[1]

Introduction

In 1948, Democratic President Harry Truman desegregated the military. Building on more than a decade of racial demographic change at the state and local levels, a growing black electorate and an emerging ideological struggle with the USSR, Truman helped catalyze a major party realignment that, with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, firmly established the Democratic Party as the party of civil rights and racial progress (Schickler, 2016a; Sitkoff, 1971).

Consequently over the following decades, conservative white Democrats, particularly those in the South, began voting for Republican presidential candidates and switching their party affiliations from Democrat to Republican (Black and Black, 2009; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Hood III et al., 2014; Kuziemko and Washington, n.d.; Lowndes, 2008). As early as the 1964 presidential election, racially conservative political elites were strategizing a movement away from the Democratic Party, with Barry Goldwater arguing that Republicans should stop appealing to African-Americans and instead pursue the disaffected white vote. By the time George Wallace ran for President in 1968, his campaign's use of racially implicit "states rights" appeals helped carry him to victory in five states of the Deep South (Carter, 2000).

By the 1970s, racial politics had been transformed. Candidates no longer made explicit appeals to race because these carried the risk of being labeled racist and losing electoral support (Mendelberg, 2001). Still seeking the votes of racially conservative whites, however, Republican candidates adapted to these new anti-discriminatory norms by crafting implicit racial appeals that conjured up stereotypical images of African Americans as "welfare queens" and "thugs," common implicit themes used successfully to drive less educated, low income and conservative whites to support Republican candidates (Martin, 1999; Mayer, 2002; McIlwain and Caliendo, 2011; Mendelberg, 2001; Winter, 2008). Indeed, today a sizable part of the Republican Party electorate is composed of white working class voters[2]

[1] https://www.greenbergresearch.com/macomb/

[2] Various definitions of "white working class" have been used by scholars (Teixeira and Abramowitz, 2008), but most incorporate education or human capital levels as indicators because these are frequently the means to participating in different segments of the labor market. We follow this approach and provide more details

who often forgo their ostensible economic interests in favor of voting on racial and cultural identification (Frank, 2007; Hutchings et al., 2011; Sears and Funk, 1990; Tesler, 2016)

More recently, highly visible Latino population growth (Newman, 2013) and partisan polarization over immigration policy (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015) may be once again transforming America's racial divide. Existing partisan coalitions that have characterized intergroup relations in American politics for decades may be changing and leading to further shifting of WWC citizens into the Republican Party's anti-immigrant embrace. As Republicans have pushed right on race, Democrats have increasingly relied on minority voters as key segments of its electoral base – and so the Democratic Party has become identified with the unique policy interests of racial and ethnic minorities (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Ahler and Sood, nd; Frymer, 2010; Greenberg, 1996; Segura and Bowler, 2006; Tesler, 2016).

While partisan affiliation is famously sticky, exhibiting stability akin to racial and religious identities (Campbell et al., 1960), we also know that mass shifts in party identification can occur when images of who the parties represent shift (Green et al., 2004). Voters ask, "which party best represents people like me?" In the current era of highly salient media coverage of Latino immigration specifically (Valentino et al., 2013) and polarized immigration policy debates (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015), conservative whites are likely to see Republican candidates as their best representatives. We also know from the Southern realignment literature (Black and Black, 2009; Hood III et al., 2014; Schickler, 2016a) that shifts in presidential voting precede shifts in partisan identity. Thus, to know whether additional partisan sorting may be occurring, it is important to examine vote switching at the presidential level.

In the current paper, we test whether a phenomenon of partisan shift is occurring again in the context of the 2016 presidential election, and more specifically whether white working class citizens flipped to Trump in 2016. We define "flippers" as eligible voters who either did not vote, or did not vote for the Republican candidate in 2012 (Romney), but who turned out and voted for Trump in 2016, or those who did not vote, or did not vote for the Democratic candidate in 2012 (Obama), but who turned out and voted for Clinton in 2016. Because of Trump's unorthodox candidacy, vote flipping could have occurred in either direction. We are thus capturing both cross party line voting as well as newly mobilized voters.

We theorize that recent Latino demographic change expanding into most counties throughout the United States (Massey, 2010), growing anti-immigrant sentiment in response to such change (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Enos, 2014; Shin et al., 2015), and Trump's vocal and frequent denunciation of immigrants and immigration policy are the primary explanations for white working class voters' propensity of flipping for Trump and Clinton. We also test alternative explanations commonly suggested for Trump's Electoral College victory, includ-

below.

ing retrospective economic voting, relative economic deprivation, manufacturing loss, and high levels of local economic dislocation (Adams, 2016; Fiorina, 1981).

Using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES), merged with extensive contextual data, we find support for the primacy of immigration explanations over economic ones in the voting behavior of white working class adults in the 2016 election. Our results show that immigration anxiety most strongly predicts new votes for Trump in 2016 among Democrats, Independents and Republicans. Weaker evidence emerges for economic arguments, with individual economic retrospective voting and economic marginality playing smaller roles than immigration. Similarly, pro-immigrant attitudes is most strongly associated with switching to Clinton among the same demographic group. Further, using an out-of-sample test on a 6-wave RAND Corporation election panel survey (Kumar et al., 2016), we replicate the main findings of our analysis and provide further confidence in the primacy of our immigration explanation.

While recent scholarship has shown that whites living in high Latino growth areas served as the nascent base of the Trump campaign during the GOP primaries (Newman, Shah, and Collingwood n.d.), here we contribute to the growing literature on white responses to Latino demographic change and perceived immigrant threats in a presidential contest. Our findings demonstrate the continued importance of immigration appeals in national elections, and the key roles that changing demographic contexts and immigrant sentiment played in forming the Trump and Clinton coalitions.

Background

Next we argue that social, political and economic changes have established conditions for white working partisan class defections. We then outline the literature informing our hypotheses. First, we outline why immigration, measured as both contextual-level demographic changes and as individual-level anti-immigrant attitudes, is likely driving vote shifts among WWC citizens. We then outline literature suggesting a competing hypothesis that vote switching is driven by retrospective economic evaluations, individual economic marginality and/or local-level economic dislocations during a sluggish economic recovery for the WWC.

The roots of our examination of white working class citizens' response to recent immigrant inflows lie in the reconfigured party system, which by the 1970s and 1980s had firmly established a perception of the Democratic Party as the party working for minority group interests (Frymer, 2010). Part of this process was driven by racial demographics, where large and consolidated black populations in the South and elsewhere triggered a sense of racial threat to conservative whites' power and status (Blalock, 1967; Key and Heard, 1950).

As early as 1949, V.O. Key wrote that "In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro" (Key and Heard, 1950, p. 5). Key found that, at its heart, the politics of the individual states of the old Confederacy varied roughly with the black population. While the "black belt" made up a small part of the South, it was white political actors in these areas that shaped the politics of the entire region. Fear of black political power and a desire to maintain white supremacy provided the impetus behind an impressive melange of vote suppression mechanisms, crippling the black vote and preserving one-party rule (see also Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958).

Feelings of racial threat, then, coupled with the Democratic Party's association with civil rights, triggered a realignment among white voters across the United States (Kuziemko and Washington, n.d.; Schickler, 2016b). By the 1980s, Ronald Reagan further capitalized on racially conservative whites' disaffection and distaste for racial change with targeted racial appeals (Mayer, 2002). Observing these trends, many southern white Democratic representatives switched party affiliation to the GOP in order to remain politically viable (Grose and Yoshinaka, 2003; Yoshinaka, 2015).

Despite these mass changes, scholars have suggested that racial realignment stopped once the Republican Party solidified its grip on the South (Bartels, 2009) and that voting across party lines is increasingly rare (Smidt, 2015). White working class partisanship outside the South, Bartels (2009) argues, has largely been stable. Even as recently as 2012, surveys were showing stable support for then President Obama among the white working class outside of the South.[3]

The White Working Class in 2016

While the Democratic Party used to be the exclusive home of the white working class voter, the increasing association of Democrats with African Americans and Civil Rights gradually shifted the stereotypical partisan groups associated with each party (Green et al., 2004), and this precipitated a shift in conservative white Democrats voting for Republicans at the national level (Black and Black, 2009). Over several decades, Southern Democrats especially shifted their partisanship to better align with their attitudes on race and race relations in the US (Green et al., 2004; Hood III et al., 2014; Kuziemko and Washington, n.d.; Schickler, 2016b; Valentino and Sears, 2005). These conservative voters were adjusting their partisanship to follow elite cues on the salient issue of race just as it divided the two parties' leaders.

Despite these shifts, during nearly every contemporary presidential election, reporters

[3] http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/09/most-country-white-working-class-likes-president-obama-just-fine

and pundits have emphasized how the white working class votes against their interests (see, e.g., Frank (2007)). Scholars generally dismiss these stories as bad conventional wisdom–zombie theories of politics that refuse to die (Bartels, 2009; Gelman, 2009; Sides, 2012). Further, Sides (2012) has argued that it makes little sense to look at the white working class because policymakers and campaigns so frequently ignore them.

While Bill Clinton did try to shift the party away from its strong association with black issues to earn back the votes of racially conservative white voters (Gest, 2016), the Democratic Party has once again shifted strategies. More recently, the Democratic Party has been actively courting the growing Latino and Asian American communities (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Barreto and Collingwood, 2015; Barreto et al., 2010; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Wong et al., 2011) while also focusing on targeting racially liberal and highly educated white voters (Silver, 2016), paying little attention to less educated and lower income whites who as a result may feel increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party.

At the same time, while the Republican Party has not been shy about using dog-whistle racial appeals to win over racially conservative voters (López, 2015), it may be too strongly associated with the wealthy elite (Ahler and Sood, nd) for working class whites to have felt like they belong in the Republican coalition (Green et al., 2004). Thus, it may be that the WWC feel alienated from both parties and the political system in general – as neither party seems to prioritize their group's interests (Kurtzleben, 2016).

Changing Latino Demographics and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

By the 21st century, scholars had expanded theories of racial threat beyond the black-white dichotomy to look at attitudes of white Americans towards a variety of out-groups. For example, Hopkins (2010) showed that when the local immigrant population grew and was politicized by salient national rhetoric, such demographic change drove down support for immigration and drove up support for restrictive immigration policies. Newman (2013) and Newman and Velez (2014) refined this result by showing that it is change in demographics conditional on small immigrant populations that spurs feelings of immigrant threat; in other words, rapid and relatively large changes in the baseline population prime feelings of immigrant threat. Using an experimental approach, Enos (2014) found that even small shifts in context, like the addition of two Spanish speakers on a subway train during a morning commute, can trigger restrictive immigration attitudes among whites.

More recent work has shown that large Latino populations, immigrant threat narratives in the popular media focused on Latinos specifically, and clear partisan polarization on immigration policy, triggers white backlash and the embrace of negative views about immigrants

generally and Latino immigrants specifically (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Brader et al., 2008; Valentino et al., 2013). Indeed, emerging evidence suggests that negative attitudes towards immigration and Latinos shape attitudes towards a variety of policy issues like welfare, health, and education (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Fox, 2004; Garand et al., 2015) and shift whites in a conservative direction and toward the Republican Party (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Craig and Richeson, 2014a; Fox, 2004).

Thus, as Latinos continue to disperse throughout the United States and communities diversify, existing evidence suggests that whites with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes and increasingly prefer conservative policies, especially in the context of campaign messages about immigrant threats (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Craig and Richeson, 2014a,b; Shin et al., 2015; Valentino et al., 2013). Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) argue that in the near-term, Latino population growth may serve to mobilize whites into the Republican Party — especially whites most likely to be economically challenged by low-skilled labor (but see hai) — as partisan elites continue to polarize on the issue. Proffering a white backlash theory, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) find evidence of a small shift in white partisan identity towards the Republicans among those with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes living in states with larger Latino populations.

What are the political implications of this white backlash effect? It depends on the stereotypes, group imagery, and messaging of political parties. As outlined by Green et al. (2004), part of young adult political socialization is ferreting out which societal groups belong to which political coalitions and where one's own group belongs within those coalitions. Because partisan stereotypes and the groups associated with political parties are fairly stable, so are individual level partisan identities once established. Yet stereotypical partisan groups do change, and though the process is slow, individual voters do update their perceptions of which groups go with which parties and adjust their own voting behavior and partisanship accordingly (Karol, 2009; Schickler, 2016b; Sundquist, 2011).

In the context of the 2016 presidential election, a similar process may be taking place as Latinos become a more important segment of the Democratic base (Barreto and Segura, 2014; Bowler and Segura, 2011). The Democratic Party, particularly Democratic presidential candidates, now openly court Latino voters (Collingwood et al., 2014). Most Latino elected officials are Democratic[4], and the national parties have diverged significantly over the last decade on immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015), as the Republican Party jettisons George W. Bush's compassionate conservatism for a hard line anti-immigrant platform while the Democratic Party strongly embraces a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants.

[4]According to NALEO, in 2014, among the partisan offices held by Latinos, 88% were Democrats

This prior research is instructive, and suggests continued partisan sorting among white working class citizens who may have refrained from voting, or who may have supported Democrats or third-party candidates in the past, but elected to vote for Trump because of his clear and consistent anti-immigrant policy positions and rhetoric appealing specifically to the white working class (e.g., see Knuckey 2017; Moore 2017; Stern 2017). We would expect this to be especially true among WWC citizens with negative attitudes towards immigrants, as well as those living in localities with the greatest increases in the Latino population specifically, the most visible face of demographic changes and immigrant threat narratives in the media.

At the same time, the immigration policy proposals and rhetoric from Trump may have driven more traditional, business-oriented and moderate whites away from the Republican presidential candidate and towards Clinton, who embraced a more toned down rhetorical approach and accommodating positions on immigration. WWC voters who supported Romney in 2012, or who did not vote previously, may have been mobilized to flip their presidential choice in the context of an usual set of candidates in 2016, and this should be especially likely among those with more positive views about immigrants and living in more demographically stable communities where immigrant threat is low. It is for these reasons that we think the great partisan sort is not fully completed, and that in 2016 new Trump/Republican voters will be associated with a backlash against immigrants, and new Clinton/Democratic voters will be associated with a backlash against Trump's anti-immigrant attacks.

- **H1**: Latino immigrant threat: white working class citizens living in counties undergoing rapid Latino growth will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump relative to similarly situated voters who do not live in counties with rapid Latino growth.

- **H2**: Anti-immigrant attitudes: White working class citizens who express higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated voters with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment.

- **H3**: Latino immigrant inclusion: WWC citizens living in counties without rapid Latino population growth will be more likely to switch their vote to Clinton relative to similarly situated voters in counties with rapid Latino growth.

- **H4**: Pro-immigrant attitudes: White working class citizens who express higher levels of pro-immigrant sentiment will be more likely to switch to Clinton than similarly situated voters with lower levels of pro-immigrant sentiment.

Economic Dislocation and Marginality

We have so far argued that the WWC are a prime demographic for Trump's reactionary appeals over immigration. Alternatively, recent economic changes and dislocation in an era of global markets and disaffection among those negatively affected by these changes may have driven the WWC to support the populist appeals of Donald Trump, whose rhetoric often dovetailed anti-immigrant themes with anti-globalization and anti-trade themes. Indeed, the media was quick to declare this economic dislocation as a key driver of voting for Trump. Adams (2016) suggested that white working class voters supported Trump because of economic anxiety. Guy Cecil, chairman of Priorities USA suggested the same. Cecil used recent polling to show that Democrats lost in 2016 specifically because their economic messaging wasn't addressing the economic anxiety among working class whites (Sargent, 2017).

There is little doubt that the WWC has been hit particularly hard by globalization and the U.S. economy's shift from manufacturing to one oriented around technology and services (Gest, 2016). Today there are three times as many white collar workers as manual workers and wages are stagnant for those without a college education (Teixeira and Abramowitz, 2008). In this sense, manufacturing decline may be disproportionately felt among the WWC (Meyerson, 2015).

In addition, the upward mobility and union protections that defined the working class's support for Democrats throughout the middle of the 20th century is no longer a reality. The post-recession job recovery during Barack Obama's tenure benefited almost exclusively college educated workers, leaving out many middle income earners (Carnevale et al., 2015). These economic dislocations have been compounded by the fraying of the community based institutions that used to help individuals during hard financial times (Putnam, 2001). As a result, the white working class is facing higher levels of suicide and fatalities relate to drug and alcohol abuse (Case and Deaton, 2015).

These broad social, political and macro economic changes have led to a perceived drop in perceptions of deserved status, what Gest (2016) calls nostalgic deprivation (see also Gest 2017). Researchers have shown that perceived threats to or decreases in status have motivated past support for reactionary movements like the temperance movement (Gusfield, 1986), the KKK in the 1920s (Parker and Barreto, 2014), and the John Birch Society (Hofstadter, 2012; Lipset and Raab, 1970; Parker and Barreto, 2014). Gest et al. (2017) finds that perceived drop in status has been a motivating factor in support for the Radical Right in Britain, the Tea Party in the U.S., and Donald Trump (see also Gest 2016; Parker and Barreto 2014).

Thus, despite the large body of work showing that immigration attitudes play a central role in recent voting trends, we cannot discount the possibility that white working class

citizens who switched to Trump in 2016 did so for economic reasons. Moreover, other work indicates that economic conditions play an outsize role in determining the outcomes of elections (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Norpoth, 1984; Norpoth et al., 1991). Political scientists regularly attempt to forecast elections based on macroeconomic conditions using metrics such as GDP growth during the second quarter (Abramowitz, 2016) and change in unemployment (Jerome and Jerome-Speziari, 2016). This body of work suggests that voters who switch from one party to another may do so for retrospective economic reasons – their personal and local economic conditions have worsened under the leadership of the party from which they switched (Fiorina, 1981). In addition, recent work has shown the geographic clustering of WWC citizens in the Midwest, and the possible role that manufacturing loss played in Trump's victory (Collingwood, 2016), suggesting another factor that may have played a role in switching to Trump. Thus, is possible that white working class citizens who did not support Romney in 2012 but then switched to Trump in 2016 did so specifically because they were struggling financially, facing economic marginality and, consistent with theories of retrospective voting, did not see Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party as one that would address their economic concerns.

Conversely, individuals with higher incomes, greater relative income, those who were employed, and those who experienced positive economic developments (improvements in personal and local economic conditions) under a Democratic president may have been drawn to switch allegiances in the context of Trump's candidacy. Indeed, the 2012 Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney came out forcefully against Trump during the campaign, and business-oriented Republicans in favor of unfettered trade voiced concerns about Trump's promises to dismantle NAFTA, pull out of the TPP and engage in a tariff war with China.[5] For white working class citizens who did not support Obama in 2012, these economic considerations may be related to switching to Clinton and the Democratic Party as better equipped to protect their economic interests.

- **H5**: Economic marginality: White working class citizens who are economically marginal — lower income, less relative income, unemployed or reporting a worse economic situation — will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated voters without such economic marginality.

- **H6**: Local economic dislocation: White working class citizens living in counties undergoing economic decline (growth in unemployment or loss in manufacturing) will be

[5]See http://www.npr.org/2016/03/04/469149303/mitt-romney-denounces-trump-speech-likely-wont-affect-trumps-standing and https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/23/trump-dumps-the-tpp-conservatives-rue-strategic-fillip-to-china.

more likely to switch their votes to Trump, relative to similarly situated voters who do not live in such counties.

- **H7**: Economic integration: White working class citizens who are economically integrated — higher income, greater relative income, employed or reporting a better economic situation — will be more likely to switch their vote to Clinton than similarly situated voters without such economic integration.

- **H8**: Local economic growth: White working class citizens living in counties undergoing economic growth (decline in unemployment or gains in manufacturing) will be more likely to switch their votes to Clinton, relative to similarly situated voters who do not live in such counties.

Data and Methods

We use the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) general survey to evaluate the above hypotheses and theoretical framework. The full dataset includes 64,600 nationally representative respondents and is well-known and widely-used. The survey is administered by YouGov/Polimetrix, with an interview period of September to November. textbffootnoteSee https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/ for full details about the survey methodology. However, because we are interested in understanding white working class vote shifts, we subset the data to non-Hispanic whites without a four-year college education.[6]

Our dependent variables are partisan vote switching from 2012 to 2016. To define switching to Trump, we took all eligible citizens in 2012 who either did not vote, or if they did, did not vote for Romney and then voted for Trump in 2016; and likewise, to define switching to Clinton, we took all eligible citizens in 2012 who either did not vote, or if they did, did not vote for Obama and then voted for Clinton in 2016. For 2016 voting, the survey asked: "For which candidate for President of the United States did you vote?" The response options were Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Jill Stein, Gary Johnson, or some other candidate. The same survey asked about 2012 voting as well: "In 2012, who did you vote for in the election for President?" The answer categories were Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, or someone else.

[6]There are numerous ways to define working-class. Educational levels, which we adopt, serve as a proxy for skill and human capital, which is increasingly essential in our changing economy (Carnevale et al., 2015). Of course, those with college degrees can hold blue-collar jobs and those without college degrees can be very successful financially. Nevertheless, using income to determine working class can be arbitrary, depending on region and cut-points used, and are often poorly reported on surveys (Teixeira and Abramowitz, 2008). We thus define working class as lacking a 4-year college degree. We estimated similar models among those in the lower tercile of the income distribution (see Table 14 in the appendix). The results are very similar to the reported models.

For switching to Trump, respondents received a 1 if they voted for Trump in 2016, or a 0 if they did not vote for Trump in 2016, conditional on having not voted for Romney in 2012. For switching to Clinton, respondents received a 1 if they voted for Clinton in 2016, or a 0 if they did not, conditional on having not voted for Obama in 2012.[7]

Because our theoretical expectations are specific to voters who identify with each of the two major parties or as independent, we conduct all analyses discretely by party identification. That is, we expect our independent variables to be related to vote switching in different ways for partisans of different stripes. Our coding decision results in three samples of n=4,629 Democrats, n=2,671 Independents, and n=548 Republicans. Thus, the total number of white working class respondents in our sample that we analyzed is n=7,848.[8]

Overall, 8% of Democrats, 26% of Independents, and 72% of Republicans who either didn't vote in 2012, or voted for a candidate other than Romney, switched to Trump in 2016.[9] In addition, 36% of Democrats, 6% of Independents, and 2% of Republicans who either didn't vote in 2012, or voted for a candidate other than Obama, switched to Clinton in 2016. Thus, while sizable shares of both Republicans and Democrats "came home" to their party's candidate in 2016, this phenomenon was prevalent only among a third of switching Democrats while almost three-fourths of switching Republicans did the same. Likewise, among Independents, switching to Trump was 20-points greater than switching to Clinton. Even among Democrats, about 1 in 12 switched to Trump, while the comparable figure for Republicans switching to Clinton in 2016 is 1 in 50. Trump's unorthodox candidacy appears to have generated widespread appeal among voters shifting away from their 2012 choices.

Nonetheless, these descriptive statistics do not say anything about which factors were most strongly related to switching to either Trump or Clinton, and whether those factors varied by partisan affiliation. To answer these questions, we used multiple regression with key independent variables to evaluate immigrant demographic threat and inclusion, anti- and pro-immigrant attitudes, economic marginality and integration, and local economic dislocation and growth hypotheses. For demographic threat and inclusion, we used Latino growth measured as the percentage change in the county-level Latino population from 2000 (Census)

[7]While readers may be concerned with using self-reported vote-choice data, we use the 2012 ANES to analyze whether WWC partisans may be more likely to lie about voting preferences and find no difference across demographic or partisan categories. We are therefore not concerned that our results are systematically biased in one direction or another by misreporting. Results of this test are in the robustness section.

[8]We also estimated pooled models, which confirmed the interactions between party and our key independent variables. We present these pooled models in the appendix in Table 5

[9]In order to address concerns that a vote switch to Trump in 2016 for 2012 Obama voters might follow a different data generating process than for non-voters in 2012, we model non-voters separately and find similar relationships between switching and our independent variables of interest, particularly immigration attitudes. We display those results in the Appendix in Table 6.

to 2010/14 (American Community Survey), conditional on baseline rates.[10] The larger the number, the greater the Latino growth. This measure is calculated for all counties in the United States then appended to the individual-level survey data based on county FIPS code. The variable's distribution is shown in Figure 1, revealing a healthy growth and distribution for each partisan subset.

Figure 1: **Distribution of county Latino growth by party identification. White working class**



Note: Histograms indicate the distribution of Latino population growth by county broken out by partisanship of WWC respondents (Source: CCES 2016, 2000 Census, 2010-2014 ACS).

For individual-level immigration attitudes, pro- and anti-, the CCES asked the following question: "What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply." Each item was coded dichotomously, where a 1 was given if the respondent answered in the "anti-immigrant" position, and a 0 otherwise.

- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. (0=Yes, 1=No)
- Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. (1=Yes, 0=No)
- Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school (0=Yes, 1=No)
- Identify and deport illegal immigrants (1=Yes, 0=No)

The four questions were combined into a single immigration attitude scale ($\alpha = 0.69$) and scaled between 0 and 1. The variable's distribution is presented in Figure 2. In general,

[10]These data are compiled from interviews each year between 2010-2014 and averaged over this window to provide accurate estimates at the county level.

Democratic identifiers are relatively pro-immigrant, Republican identifiers are strongly anti-immigrant, and Independents lean anti-immigrant. That said, a sizable portion of Democrats and Independents nonetheless favor anti-immigrant policies, with 32% of Independents and 19% of Democrats scoring .5 or above on the scale.

Figure 2: **Distribution of WWC anti-immigrant attitudes by party identification**



Note: Bars indicate distribution of WWC immigration attitudes broken out by partisan identification for WWC voters (Source: CCES 2016).

We measured economic marginality in four ways. First, respondents were asked: "Over the past FOUR YEARS, has your household's annual income increased a lot (1), increased somewhat (2), stayed about the same (3), decreased somewhat (4), or decreased a lot (5)?" We conceptualized respondents who perceived a worse economic situation as experiencing economic marginality. We conceptualized respondents who perceived a better economic situation as experiencing economic integration. We scaled this item between 0 and 1 and display their distribution in Figure 3.

We also test our economic marginality and integration hypotheses separately using respondents' family income and employment status. We conceptualize lower income and unemployment as greater marginality, and higher income and full-time employment as as greater integration. In addition, we construct a relative economic condition variable from a combination of the respondent's family income and their surrounding economic environment. We code the respondent as economically marginal if (1) their family income is lower than the median income in their county of residence, or not marginal (0) if their family income is equal to or higher than the median income of their county of residence. As with our retrospective economic evaluation item, we expect WWC respondents with greater economic marginality (perceived worsened economic situation, lower income, family income lower than county, or unemployed status) will be more likely to switch to Trump, while WWC respondents with greater economic integration (perceived improved economic situation, higher income, family

Figure 3: **Distribution of WWC personal economic situation by party identification**



Note: Bars indicate distribution of WWC personal economic situation broken out by partisan identification for WWC voters. Higher values indicate larger perceived decreases in household annual income (Source: CCES 2016).

income higher than county, or employed) will be more likely to switch to Clinton.

To gauge local economic dislocation and growth explanations, we used percent change in unemployment from 2000-2014 and percent manufacturing loss from 2000-2014 in the respondent's county. If the local economic context hypotheses are related to vote-switching, then we will observe WWC voters who lived in communities with higher manufacturing losses or higher unemployment rates to flip at higher rates than WWC voters living in less adversely affected environments. We display the distribution of these variables in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

Beyond these key independent variables, we included several control variables in our analyses that may be related to vote switching, including racial resentment[11], ideology, union household, female, military household, religious importance, born-again Christian, a dummy for geographic South, and a dummy for rural. The survey questions and coding for these variables can be found in the appendix, and the results are available upon request.

Finally, we included a measure for percent foreign born in the respondent's county. While it could be that the white working class is responding to immigration-based contextual demographic change more broadly, rather than Latino growth specifically, we suspect this is unlikely. Past research indicates that whites oppose the growth of the Latino population more than that of the Asian or white ethnic populations (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015).

[11]Following Schaffner (n.d.) we combine three questions on racial attitudes: 1) "I am angry that racism exists"; 2) "White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin"; and 3) "Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations." The attitude scale ($\alpha = 0.69$) is recoded to a 0-1 interval.

Figure 4: **Distribution of percent change in manufacturing in WWC respondent counties by party identification**



Note: Bars indicate distribution of percent change in manufacturing in respondents' counties broken out by partisan identification for WWC voters. Higher values indicate larger changes in manufacturing loss (Source: CCES 2016).

Figure 5: **Distribution of percent change in unemployment rates in WWC respondent counties by party identification**



Note: Bars indicate distribution of percent change in unemployment in respondents' counties broken out by partisan identification for WWC voters. Higher values indicate larger changes of unemployment (Source: CCES 2016).

In order to isolate relationships between vote switching and Latino growth specifically, we therefore include a control for county level foreign born percent of the total population into our analyses.

Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate three logistic regression models, split-sampled by party identification. While we present standard logit models, we estimated varying intercept models presuming a hierarchical structure where county is the grouping variable (see appendix).[12] We find the same substantive results regardless of model specification.

Results

Table 1 presents our main set of results for switching to Trump, with separate models for WWC Democrats, Independents and Republicans. The models include variables testing for both immigrant- (H1, H3) and economics-related hypotheses (H5, H7). We present results for switching to Trump first because this is where most of the movement from 2012 occurred. Because logistic regression coefficients are difficult to interpret, we simulate counterfactuals of interest and plot the results with 95% confidence intervals for ease of interpretation.

We begin with our contextual immigrant threat measure of Latino population growth, which allows us to test H1 that local Latino population growth will be associated with a greater likelihood of switching to Trump. Here the coefficient for Latino population growth is positive and in the expected direction, though the relationship is only statistically significant among Democrats. Examining Figure 6, we see a positive and substantively large relationship between country-level Latino population growth and vote switching to Trump, increasing from a probability of about 3% to almost 60% for Democrats, and from 16% to almost 40% for Independents. These findings generally corroborate existing research showing that Trump was able to garner support among whites in areas undergoing rapid growth in Latino population (Newman, Shah, and Collingwood, n.d.).

Our second hypothesis for flipping to Trump (anti-immigrant attitudes) posited that WWC citizens who expressed high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment will be more likely to switch than similar voters who have positive views towards immigrants. Indeed, we find a relatively large and statistically significant relationship between immigration views and switching to Trump among all partisans (see Figure 7). WWC Democrats with the most anti-immigrant views were about 10.3 percentage points more likely to switch their vote to Trump than those with the most positive views towards immigrants. WWC Independents with the

[12]We centered county-level variables; results presented in Table 7 and in Figures 12, 13, and 14. No substantive differences emerged.

Table 1: Predictors of Flipping to Trump among White Working Class Voters

	Dependent variable:		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.124***	2.193***	1.979***
	(0.200)	(0.183)	(0.360)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003**	0.001	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.003*	0.002	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Racial Resentment	3.181***	3.241***	2.547***
	(0.333)	(0.286)	(0.623)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.780***	1.159***	1.552***
	(0.275)	(0.235)	(0.465)
Relative Deprivation	0.291	−0.185	−0.028
	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.338)
Unemployed	0.452	0.069	0.255
	(0.280)	(0.277)	(0.602)
Family Income (low-high)	0.083**	0.002	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.064)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.010*	−0.003	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.003**	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.072	0.093	0.040
	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.160)
Female	−0.393***	0.428***	−0.249
	(0.133)	(0.121)	(0.239)
Military HH	0.276*	0.271*	−0.650**
	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.289)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.492***	0.567***	0.231
	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.141)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.243***	0.210***	0.334***
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.115)
Born-Again	0.483***	0.255*	−0.101
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.260)
South	−0.066	0.258*	0.177
	(0.165)	(0.138)	(0.275)
Rural	0.275*	0.278**	−0.235
	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.279)
Constant	−7.788***	−6.760***	−3.515***
	(0.523)	(0.472)	(0.871)
Observations	4,629	2,671	548
Log Likelihood	−939.283	−1,052.128	−269.495
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,916.565	2,142.256	576.990
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 6: **Latino Demographic Threat and Flipping to Trump**



Note: lines indicate simulated predicted probability of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of Latino population growth with all other variables held at their means.

most anti-immigrant attitudes were 34.3 percentage points more likely to switch their vote, and WWC Republicans with the most anti-immigrant attitudes were 44 percentage points more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016. These findings are strongly supportive of a white backlash effect.

Turning next to our economic explanations, we find weaker relationships between economic variables and vote switching to Trump. Our fifth hypothesis posited that WWC citizens with greater economic marginality, variously measured, will be more likely to switch to Trump than similarly situated voters with better economic positions. We find limited evidence for this hypothesis, with respondents' perceptions of their economic situation the only consistent predictor of switching. WWC Democrats were 6.5 percentage points more likely to switch, WWC Independents were 16.3 percentage points more likely to switch, and WWC Republicans were 28.6 percentage points more likely to switch their votes to Trump if they perceived their economic situation had worsened over the last four years. As can be seen in Figure 8, these relationships are substantively and statistically significant, though smaller in magnitude (flatter slopes) than those for immigration attitudes. Employment status, relative economic status, and family income had almost no significant relationships to switching, although WWC Democrats with greater incomes were, contrary to our expectations, somewhat more likely to switch to Trump.

While individual-level measures of economic marginality are only weakly associated with flipping to Trump in 2016, perhaps contextual-level indicators are more robust predictors of switching given the Trump campaign's focus on widespread job losses and manufacturing

Figure 7: **Anti-immigrant Attitudes and Flipping to Trump**



Note: lines indicate simulated predicted probability of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of immigration attitudes and all other variables held at their means.

Figure 8: **Retrospective Economic Evaluations and Flipping to Trump**



Note: lines indicate simulated predicted probability of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of perceived economic decline with all other variables held at their means.

decline in the U.S. Our sixth hypothesis (local economic dislocation) posited that WWC citizens who lived in economically declining counties were more likely to switch to Trump than similarly situated voters whose communities were not undergoing economic decline. As can be seen in Figures 9 and 10, we find no relationship between county-level economic decline and vote switching in 2016.

Figure 9: **County-level Manufacturing Loss and Flipping to Trump**



Note: lines indicate simulated predicted probabilities of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of county manufacturing loss, with all other variables held at their means.

Overall, we find that among the WWC, Latino population growth and anti-immigrant attitudes are more strongly and consistently associated with vote switching to Trump than economic indicators. Even so, our most consistent results across partisanship are for individual-level attitudes about immigrants and retrospective economic evaluations. Theoretically, these individual-level variables are likely endogenous: worsened economic evaluations contribute to anti-immigrant attitudes, and/or vice-versa, with the two probably interacting over time. However, our specific argument does not pertain to the causal relationship between these two variables; rather, we are interested in whether these variables are predictive of vote switching. Moreover, the two variables are likely to run in the same direction: someone who reports worsened economic evaluations *and* high anti-immigrant sentiment will be more likely to switch to Trump than someone who is high on one variable and low on the other, or low on both. We tested this proposition with an interaction model, where we include a product term for personal economic evaluations and anti-immigrant attitudes.

The results are presented in Table 8 in the appendix, with simulated outcomes shown below in Figure 11. A statistically significant interaction emerges for both Democrats and Independents. For all partisans, immigration attitudes tend to trump economic attitudes,

Figure 10: **County-level Unemployment and Flipping to Trump**



Note: Points indicate simulated predicted probability of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of change in contextual unemployment with all other variables held at their means.

consistent with our primary results; however, economic views still provide some additional explanatory purchase. The points furthest to the left simulate Trump-switching for voters with low levels of anti-immigrant attitudes and varying levels of retrospective economic evaluations, and these voters are unlikely to switch to Trump. However, among voters high on both measures, the predicted probability of switching to Trump is 0.2 for Democrats, 0.5 for Independents, and 0.9 for Republicans. Voters were evidently responding to both economic anxiety and anti-immigrant sentiment in making their switching decisions, even though most of our findings suggest the latter was more strongly related to vote switching than the former.

Figure 11: **Interaction of Immigrant Attitudes and Retrospective Economic Evaluations**



Note: Points indicate simulated predicted probability of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, personal economic situation worse (economic anxiety) and their interaction. All other model variable held at their means.

Flipping for Clinton?

If WWC citizens with strong anti-immigration views and negative retrospective economic evaluations switched their votes to Trump in 2016, theories of partisan realignment would suggest those with positive immigration attitudes and improved economic situations would switch to Clinton. To test this, we ran similar models as above on our sample of WWC citizens who either did not vote in 2012, or voted for a candidate other than Obama (i.e switched to Clinton). While percent Latino growth is not statistically significant, we again find evidence for our immigration attitudes measure (see Table 9).

Breaking down the relationships by party, Democrats with the most positive views of immigrants were 24 percentage points (95% CI: [8.1,40.4,]) more likely to switch to Clinton in 2016 than those with the most negative views of immigrants. In addition, while relationships were weaker than for switching to Trump, they are still statistically significant for Independents (2.4 percentage-points; 95% CI: [1,4.5]) and Republicans (3.2 percentage-points; 95% CI: [1.7,5.3]). These results offer fairly strong evidence that immigration attitudes helped push voters in both directions in 2016. WWC citizens with strong anti-immigrant views switched to Trump, while WWC citizens with strong pro-immigrant views switched to Clinton.

Economic indicators again yield weaker associations with vote switching than immigration attitudes. Only retrospective economic evaluations are related to vote switching to Clinton in 2016. For Democrats, moving from worse off to better off financially is not associated with switching, but it is associated with switching for Independents (1.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of switching; 95% CI: [0.4,3.7]) and likewise for Republicans (1 percentage-point increase; 95% CI: [0.07,1.7]). Thus, while significant, these relationships are substantively quite small. Moreover, relative economic status, employment status, family income, county-level manufacturing loss, and county-level unemployment levels are all unrelated to vote switching for Clinton.[13] Overall, much like our findings on flipping to Trump, we find very weak evidence that economic indicators were related to WWC voters' decisions to flip to Clinton. Instead, immigration attitudes were the most important.[14]

[13]The lone exception is increasing family income among independents, which is positively related to switching ($p < 0.05$), consistent with expectations.

[14]In addition, we ran the same immigration attitudes X retrospective economic evaluations interaction model for switching to Clinton and found similar, though weaker, relationships as we did for switching to Trump. See Figure 15 and Table 9 in the Appendix for more details.

Table 2: Predictors of Switching to Clinton

	Dependent variable:		
	Vote for Clinton		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pro-Immigrant Scale	1.093***	1.049***	2.448***
	(0.379)	(0.292)	(0.368)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	−0.003	−0.002	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.001	−0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Positive Racial Attitudes	1.850***	4.285***	3.530***
	(0.645)	(0.523)	(0.661)
Personal Econ Situation Better	0.608	0.931**	1.074**
	(0.542)	(0.373)	(0.486)
Not Relatively Deprived	0.089	0.499	−0.050
	(0.723)	(0.425)	(0.624)
Employed	0.098	−0.024	0.002
	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.060)
Family Income (low-high)	0.004	0.016**	0.0005
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.004	−0.00001	0.004*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.321	−0.018	−0.191
	(0.397)	(0.276)	(0.349)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.327*	−0.322**	−0.224
	(0.170)	(0.143)	(0.175)
Female	0.222	0.828***	0.567**
	(0.279)	(0.196)	(0.270)
Military HH	−0.508	−0.749***	−0.370
	(0.356)	(0.289)	(0.326)
Ideology (lib-consv)	−0.230	−0.598***	−0.886***
	(0.156)	(0.124)	(0.149)
Religion Important (none-lot)	−0.176	−0.173**	−0.272**
	(0.133)	(0.087)	(0.123)
Born-Again	0.143	−0.147	−0.365
	(0.297)	(0.229)	(0.275)
South	−0.328	0.259	−0.381
	(0.297)	(0.200)	(0.262)
Rural	−0.502	−0.318	−0.594*
	(0.329)	(0.239)	(0.336)
Constant	−1.295	−4.340***	−3.061***
	(1.212)	(0.801)	(1.025)
Observations	401	3,223	5,072
Log Likelihood	−218.911	−497.704	−367.906
Akaike Inf. Crit.	475.822	1,033.407	773.813
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robustness and Extensions

The analysis thus far lends greater support to a theory of immigration backlash among WWC citizens than to one about economic decline. These results are consistent with the historical record of racial realignment of the party system (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Sundquist, 2011), and with the greater salience of Trump's anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric. However, because of limitations in data availability and the uncertain nature of cross-sectional records, our analysis is susceptible to some biases. As robustness checks, we evaluated potential threats to the validity of our findings.

Measuring Latino Population Growth

One potential issue is that we use Latino growth from 2000 - 2010-14 from the American Community Survey (ACS). This is the approach that Hopkins (2010) and others have taken when analyzing demographic change and specifically Latino growth. The ACS combines surveys from 2010-2014 so that there is sufficient data to make precise estimates about certain geographies, otherwise we would have used 2014 alone. As a check that our results were not driven by this decision, we estimated our models with Census data from 2000 and 2010. Table 10 in the appendix shows our model estimates but using the 2000-2010 Census county change measure instead of the ACS 2000 - 2010/14 measure. This alternative specification does not change our substantive findings in any way.

Latino Population Growth Versus Size

Another possibility is that WWC voters are responding to Latino population size, as opposed to Latino population growth. While Newman and Velez (2014) argued that growth is the key factor related to backlash attitudes, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) argue that size is most important because it is more noticeable. We evaluate the second possibility by estimating a model that includes both growth and size of the Latino population. Table 13 shows the coefficient estimates, which indicate that our core findings do not change. Greater Latino population growth predicts switching to Trump among Democrats, and greater Latino population size predicts switching to Trump among independents. Either way, Latino demographics are an important factor in vote-switching to Trump, and individual-level immigration attitudes remain the more robust predictors.

Residential Self-Selection

While our individual-level measure of immigration attitudes is a strong predictor of vote switching for both Trump and Clinton, our contextual measure of Latino population growth also predicts switching to Trump, which suggests that working class whites are responding to increasing Latino presence in their local area. If this is indeed the case, the theoretical mechanism may be that whites are responding to their perceptions of shifts in local cultural norms. However, it is possible that some WWC voters in our data moved to their place of residence only recently, and so would not have been exposed to longer-term decennial changes in their local area. Only respondents who actually lived through changing demographic contexts should be inclined to switch their vote to Trump if this mechanism is correct.

To test this, we used a question in the CCES about length of residential location and subset our data to only those who had lived in their place of residence for five years or more. These WWC respondents were the most likely to experience demographic change directly. Under this alternative specification, relationships between our key immigrant variables (anti-immigration views and Latino population growth) and vote-switching to Trump remain essentially unchanged, as shown in Table 11. Further, these relationships disappear when we look only at those who lived in their place of residence for less than five years, as shown in Table 12. These patterns point to shifts in residential demographic context as an important mechanism for flipping WWC voters to Trump.

Defining the White Working Class

We also recognize that defining the white working class is up for debate. Following Gest (2016), we defined the WWC as those who identified racially as white and indicated the lack of a four-year college degree. Nonetheless, we allow that there are many whites without a four-year college degree who are highly successful financially, and may not be affected by any of our indicators of economic decline. We also allow that there are many whites who hold a four-year college degree and yet struggle financially. That being said, a college degree increasingly separates economic winners and losers in our changing economy, and we believe the political implications of this separation is important to test empirically. Nevertheless, we conduct a check on whether changing our specification of the white working class from those without a college degree to those who fall into the lower income tercile changes our results (see Table 14). We find that the coefficients on immigration attitudes are largely the same, though our estimate of Latino population growth is no longer statistically significant.

Learning or Priming?

Recent research in political science has shown that, rather than holding policy attitudes that inform their candidate choices, most voters simply adopt the policy views of the leaders they support (Lenz 2012). This may lead some readers to worry that voters in our data switched their support to Trump for reasons not captured by our independent variables, and then simply adopted his anti-immigrant views. We are skeptical that this is the case with immigration attitudes, which like racial attitudes are likely to be sufficiently crystallized, salient and durable as to constitute a predisposition largely immune to change (Tesler, 2015). Nevertheless, the possibility of reverse causality between immigration attitudes and vote-switching exists and requires an approach different from ours to rule out.

To address this, we leveraged a 6-Wave RAND study and tested the extent to which immigration attitudes as measured in May of 2015, before Trump's rise to prominence, predicted a vote-switch to Trump in November of 2016.[15] The panel nature of the RAND data allows us to test whether pre-existing immigration attitudes are related to switching to Trump, before respondents had been exposed to Trump's anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric. If respondents' pre-existing immigration attitudes, free of exposure to leaders' policy positions, are related to vote-switching, we should be less worried about a reverse causal process.

However, because the RAND survey contains a much smaller N, we have far less statistical power and therefore have to pool the data. Despite this limitation, the pattern of results is essentially identical to those reported previously. While the Latino growth variable is not significant (which is not surprising given the much smaller dataset), we find that white working class citizens with strong anti-immigrant views (as measured in 2015) were significantly more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016, compared to those with positive attitudes towards immigrants (see Table 15). We also find similar effects for the economic variables.

Biased Self-Reporting

Finally, we acknowledge that our measure of vote-choice and vote-switching is based on self-reports. Previous research has shown that poor recall, social desirability and lying may bias such self-reports (Krosnick, 1991; Tourangeau et al., 2000), generally in the direction of the winner of the election (Wright, 1990). If this is the case in our survey, it should bias responses towards consistency and lead to fewer reported vote-switchers than in reality. Thus, our results may understate the extent of vote-switching. Since we cannot rule out the possibility of lying about who respondents voted for, there may be systematic bias in our results.

[15] We again defined our dependent variable as switching from non-voting or voting for someone other than Romney in 2012, to voting for Trump in 2016.

To assess this possibility, we analyzed the 2012 ANES, which included a variable for self-reported voting in 2008 and 2012 as well as officially validated indicators of voting in 2008 and 2012. While the secret ballot prevents us from assessing lying about candidate choices (and vote switching), we can check for any systematic bias in self-report of voting more generally. We find that WWC voters are no more likely than other groups to lie about whether they voted or not (see Table 3).

Table 3: [In]correct vote reporting by partisanship, 2012 and 2008 ANES

	Partisanship	Lied About 2012 Vote	Lied About 2008 Vote
White Working Class	Democrat	20%	25%
	Republican	22%	26%
	Independent	19%	18%
	Other	39%	11%
Everyone Else	Democrat	24%	28%
	Republican	17%	24%
	Independent	16%	16%
	Other	14%	15%

Note: Cells represent weighted proportions of white working class respondents, broken out by party, who lied about voting on the 2012 and 2008 ANES surveys. To calculate whether respondents lied or not, we merged survey respondents with the 2012 and 2008 ANES vote validated files. We then calculated the proportion of Democratic, Republican, Independent, and other WWC and non-WWC respondents who said they voted but had voter records that said otherwise. We find no differences across parties or years of self-reported voting.

Discussion

The 2016 election was unique both for the unorthodox candidacy of Donald Trump, and for featuring the first female nominee of the two major parties. These candidates drew new voters to vote for them, either by flipping votes from the other party, or by mobilizing new voters out of complacency. In this investigation, we sought to understand whether immigration or economics played a bigger role in this process, focusing specifically on the white working class because these voters were prime targets for possible conversion. Moreover, as Democrats have moved to consolidate support among Latinos, Asian Americans, Muslims and other minority groups, Trump and the GOP—at least in 2016—moved in the opposite direction and appealed explicitly to disaffected white voters.

In this paper we showed that white working class citizens most likely to switch to Trump were those with strong anti-immigrant attitudes and who lived in neighborhoods undergoing rapid demographic change. At the same time, WWC voters who switched to Clinton moved in

her direction precisely because of their pro-immigration views. This contemporary switching activity is consistent with past periods of partisan shifts over matters of race, suggesting immigration may be a new wedge issue causing further cross-party voting (Hillygus and Shields, 2014). We show that immigration, more than economics, was of central relevance to switching activity in the 2016 election among white working class voters who switched both to Clinton and Trump.

While this, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of additional partisan realignment, history suggests that large changes in voting across party lines, particularly for the presidency, precede changes in party affiliation, the basis for realignments. This happened historically with racially conservative white southern Democrats, and here we provide evidence that it is happening again over immigration. Those with the most anti-immigrant views are moving right (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015) and were the most likely to switch to Trump in 2016. Indeed, social psychology experiments have found that priming white respondents with demographic change causes them to become more conservative (CITE). We suggest the vote switching that we find in 2016 is indicative of further realignment of working class whites into the Republican Party.

Our findings also speak to how elites are responding to changing demographics. As communities around the country diversify, immigration has become an increasingly potent wedge issue (Hillygus and Shields, 2014). White working class citizens feel left behind as the Democratic Party becomes the party of highly educated whites and a consortium of minority groups. The Republican Party, historically, has not offered many of these disaffected white working class voters a home. But, as union membership has dropped, fewer and fewer WWC voters fall under the auspices and guidance of labor politics. Instead, Trump, who spurned the GOP establishment, played to a sense of resentment over a changing country that politicized local contexts and flipped a non-trivial number of working class whites to vote for him.

Appendix

Control variables:

- Which of the following best describes your current employment status? 1=unemployed, 0=else
- Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 1=Less than $10,000; 2$ =10,000 - $19,999; 3$ =20,000 - $29,999; 4$ =30,000 - $39,999; 5$ =40,000 - $49,999; 6$ =50,000 - $59,999; 7$ =60,000 - $69,999; 8$ =70,000 - $79,999; 9$ =80,000 - $99,999; 10$ =100,000 - $119,999; 11$ =120,000 - $149,999; 31$ =150,000 or more.
- Are you a member of a labor union? Other than yourself, is any member of your household a union member? 1 = Yes, I am currently a member of a labor union; Yes, a member of my household is currently a union member; 2 = I formerly was a member of a labor union; A member of my household was formerly a member of a labor union, but is not now 3 = I am not now, nor have I been, a member of a labor union; No, no one in my household has ever been a member of a labor union
- Are you male or female? 1 = female, 0 = male
- We'd like to know whether you or someone in your immediate family is currently serving or has ever served in the U.S. military. Immediate family is defined as your parents, siblings, spouse, and children. Please check all boxes that apply. I am currently serving in the U.S. military (1); I have immediate family members currently serving in the U.S. military (1); I previously served in the U.S. military but I am no longer active (1); (0) Members of my immediate family have served in the U.S. military but are no longer active; Neither myself nor any members of my immediate family have ever served in the U.S. military (0)
- In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Very liberal (1); Liberal (2); Moderate / Not sure (3); Conservative (4); Very conservative (5)
- How important is religion in your life? Very important (4), Somewhat important (3), Not too important (2), Not at all important (1)
- Would you describe yourself as a born-again; or evangelical Christian (1), or not (0)?
- Congress considers many issues: If you were in Congress would you vote FOR (1) or AGAINST (0) each of the following?

Table 4: Variable Coding

Variable	Data Type	Code
DV: Vote Switch	Dummy	1=Vote for Trump, 0=Not Vote for Trump
Anti-immigrant scale	Ordinal	0-1
Personal Econ Situation Worse	Ordinal	0-1
Unemployed	Dummy	1=Unemployed, 0=Not unemployed
Family Income	Ordinal	1-12 (low to high)
Racial Resentment	Scale	0-1
Union	Ordinal	1 - 3
Female	Dummy	1=Female, 0 = Male
Military Household	Dummy	1=Military Household, 0=Not military
Ideology	Ordinal	1-5 (liberal - conservative)
Religion Important	Ordinal	1-4 (not important - important)
Born Again Christian	Dummy	1=Yes, 0=No
South	Dummy	1=South, 0=Not South
Rural	Dummy	1=Rural County, 0=Not Rural
Percent Latino Growth (00-14)	Numeric	-100, 1607, median=72.7
Percent Latino	Numeric	0-100
Percent Foreign-Born Growth (00-14)	Numeric	-100, 1084, median=29.29
Percent Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	Numeric	-1224.14 - , 100, median=22.7
Percent Unemployment Difference (00-14)	Numeric	-100, 1826.22, median=51.09
Relative Economic Deprivation	Dummy	1=Income below county median income, 0=otherwise

Table 5: Predictors of switching to Trump among Pooled Sample

	Dependent variable:
	vote_trump
	WWC
Party Identification (D-I-R)	1.228***
	(0.058)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.117***
	(0.124)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.001*
	(0.001)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.0002
	(0.001)
Racial Resentment	3.096***
	(0.201)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.357***
	(0.165)
Relative Deprivation	0.038
	(0.119)
Unemployed	0.265
	(0.186)
Family Income (low-high)	0.041*
	(0.023)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.002
	(0.003)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.0001
	(0.001)
Union (no, was, is)	0.014
	(0.053)
Female	0.039
	(0.082)
Military HH	0.130
	(0.099)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.486***
	(0.053)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.249***
	(0.039)
Born-Again	0.307***
	(0.099)
South	0.117
	(0.096)
Rural	0.226**
	(0.097)
Constant	−8.836***
	(0.330)
Observations	7,848
Log Likelihood	−2,304.953
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,649.907
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Predictors of Switching to Trump for New WWC Voters

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	1.967***	2.358***	2.442***
	(0.425)	(0.284)	(0.461)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002	0.005**	−0.0003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.0001	−0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Racial Resentment	2.521***	3.929***	0.923
	(0.701)	(0.503)	(0.799)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.145**	−0.050	0.405
	(0.584)	(0.353)	(0.556)
Relative Deprivation	0.196	0.136	1.354
	(0.479)	(0.328)	(1.045)
Unemployed	0.026	−0.054	−0.128*
	(0.088)	(0.051)	(0.071)
Family Income (low-high)	−0.001	0.007	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001	−0.195	−0.601
	(0.482)	(0.290)	(0.415)
Union (no, was, is)	0.294	−0.034	0.303
	(0.187)	(0.132)	(0.224)
Female	−0.692**	−0.135	0.378
	(0.298)	(0.194)	(0.309)
Military HH	0.166	0.159	0.403
	(0.383)	(0.265)	(0.397)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.246	0.554***	0.145
	(0.152)	(0.129)	(0.183)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.165	0.137	0.188
	(0.138)	(0.090)	(0.147)
Born-Again	0.370	0.183	0.349
	(0.326)	(0.234)	(0.318)
South	−0.234	−0.114	0.429
	(0.337)	(0.214)	(0.317)
Rural	0.650**	0.075	0.184
	(0.299)	(0.213)	(0.364)
Constant	−5.410***	−4.292***	−0.998
	(1.034)	(0.715)	(1.141)
Observations	628	897	723
Log Likelihood	−203.264	−425.879	−203.550
Akaike Inf. Crit.	444.528	889.757	445.101
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Predictors of Switching to Trump (Hierarchical County-level specification)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.124***	2.256***	1.979***
	(0.200)	(0.195)	(0.360)
Personal Economic Situation Worse	0.163**	0.039	−0.106
	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.130)
Unemployed	−0.142*	0.080	0.218
	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.140)
Family Income (low-high)	3.181***	3.320***	2.547***
	(0.333)	(0.300)	(0.623)
Union (no, was, is)	1.780***	1.199***	1.552***
	(0.275)	(0.243)	(0.465)
Female	0.291	−0.180	−0.028
	(0.198)	(0.178)	(0.338)
Military HH	0.452	0.059	0.255
	(0.280)	(0.285)	(0.602)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.083**	0.003	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.064)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.124*	−0.032	−0.074
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.106)
Born-Again	−0.151**	0.102*	0.047
	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.121)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	−0.072	0.094	0.040
	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.160)
Pct. Foreign Born Growth	−0.393***	0.437***	−0.249
	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.239)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.276*	0.271*	−0.650**
	(0.161)	(0.142)	(0.289)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.492***	0.582***	0.231
	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.141)
Relative Economic Deprivation	0.243***	0.213***	0.334***
	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.115)
South	0.483***	0.269*	−0.101
	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.260)
Rural	−0.066	0.252*	0.177
	(0.165)	(0.146)	(0.275)
Constant	0.275*	0.291**	−0.235
	(0.155)	(0.146)	(0.279)
Constant	−7.689***	−6.749***	−3.540***
	(0.500)	(0.485)	(0.837)
Observations	4,629	2,671	548
Log Likelihood	−939.283	−1,051.234	−269.495
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,918.565	2,142.469	578.990
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	2,047.367	2,260.273	665.115
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 12: **Varying Intercepts Hierarchical Model Marginal Effects (WWC Democrats)**



Figure 13: **Varying Intercepts Hierarchical Model Marginal Effects (WWC Independents)**



Figure 14: **Varying Intercepts Hierarchical Model Marginal Effects (WWC Republicans)**



Table 8: Predictors of Switching to Trump (Anti-immigrant Attitudes and Retrospective Economic Evaluations Interaction Model)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	3.014***	2.949***	2.492***
	(0.481)	(0.431)	(0.836)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003**	0.001	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.003*	0.002	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Racial Resentment	3.166***	3.246***	2.552***
	(0.331)	(0.286)	(0.624)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	2.727***	1.935***	2.025**
	(0.536)	(0.460)	(0.838)
Relative Deprivation	0.292	−0.192	−0.040
	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.338)
Unemployed	0.441	0.065	0.291
	(0.279)	(0.275)	(0.602)
Family Income (low-high)	0.082**	0.002	0.042
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.064)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.010*	−0.003	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.003**	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.066	0.093	0.040
	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.160)
Female	−0.389***	0.428***	−0.249
	(0.133)	(0.121)	(0.239)
Military HH	0.283*	0.275**	−0.653**
	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.289)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.490***	0.569***	0.224
	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.142)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.241***	0.215***	0.334***
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.115)
Born-Again	0.474***	0.241	−0.091
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.260)
South	−0.055	0.265*	0.177
	(0.165)	(0.138)	(0.275)
Rural	0.265*	0.284**	−0.241
	(0.154)	(0.140)	(0.279)
Anti-immigrant X Personal Econ	−1.670**	−1.373**	−0.971
	(0.811)	(0.699)	(1.416)
Constant	−8.271***	−7.199***	−3.737***
	(0.579)	(0.528)	(0.934)
Observations	4,629	2,671	548
Log Likelihood	−937.177	−1,050.206	−269.260
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,914.354	2,140.411	578.519
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 15: **Interaction of Immigrant Attitudes and Retrospective Economic Evaluations on Switching for Clinton**



Note: Points indicate simulated predicted probability of vote switching with 95% confidence intervals given a change from minimum to maximum levels of pro-immigrant sentiment, personal economic situation, and their interaction. All other model variable held at their means.

Table 9: Predictors of WWC Shifting to Trump in 2016 (WWC as low income)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_clinton		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pro-Immigrant Scale	1.336***	1.622***	0.049
	(0.441)	(0.416)	(0.970)
Personal Econ Situation Better	1.178**	1.818***	−1.302
	(0.489)	(0.507)	(1.171)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	−0.004***	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.003*	−0.003*	−0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Positive Racial Attitudes	3.147***	4.194***	2.008**
	(0.338)	(0.331)	(0.807)
Not Relatively Deprived	0.128	0.087	0.309
	(0.314)	(0.290)	(0.811)
Employed	−0.024	−0.023	−0.087
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.085)
Family Income (low-high)	0.001	0.005	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.003**	0.0002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.211	−0.0004	0.624
	(0.195)	(0.180)	(0.444)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.091	0.012	0.135
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.200)
Female	0.150	0.225*	0.213
	(0.134)	(0.123)	(0.308)
Military HH	−0.236	0.225	0.320
	(0.164)	(0.148)	(0.376)
Ideology (lib-consv)	−0.299***	−0.105	−0.316*
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.182)
Religion Important (none-lot)	−0.077	−0.079	−0.177
	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.152)
Born-Again	−0.482***	−0.474***	0.246
	(0.158)	(0.176)	(0.338)
South	0.158	0.001	−0.116
	(0.169)	(0.145)	(0.363)
Rural	−0.208	−0.557***	−0.283
	(0.155)	(0.145)	(0.370)
Imm X Econ	1.113	−0.541	3.890**
	(0.832)	(0.765)	(1.912)
Constant	−0.859	−4.176***	−1.722
	(0.573)	(0.583)	(1.316)
Observations	3,337	1,836	383
Log Likelihood	−919.209	−963.492	−166.933
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,878.418	1,966.985	373.867
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Predictors of Switching to Trump (Pct. Latino Growth 2000-2010 only)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.121***	2.194***	1.972***
	(0.200)	(0.183)	(0.361)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-10)	0.010**	−0.0001	−0.011
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.003*	0.002*	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Racial Resentment	3.191***	3.236***	2.543***
	(0.333)	(0.286)	(0.624)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.778***	1.153***	1.580***
	(0.275)	(0.235)	(0.467)
Relative Deprivation	0.291	−0.190	−0.027
	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.338)
Unemployed	0.442	0.079	0.253
	(0.281)	(0.277)	(0.603)
Family Income (low-high)	0.085**	0.001	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.064)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.011**	−0.003	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.004**	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.072	0.092	0.034
	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.160)
Female	−0.389***	0.425***	−0.242
	(0.133)	(0.121)	(0.239)
Military HH	0.283*	0.272**	−0.659**
	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.289)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.486***	0.567***	0.231
	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.141)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.243***	0.212***	0.335***
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.115)
Born-Again	0.485***	0.255*	−0.102
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.260)
South	−0.089	0.262*	0.222
	(0.166)	(0.139)	(0.280)
Rural	0.295*	0.280**	−0.250
	(0.154)	(0.140)	(0.279)
Constant	−7.936***	−6.710***	−3.313***
	(0.537)	(0.489)	(0.895)
Observations	4,629	2,671	548
Log Likelihood	−939.887	−1,052.352	−269.049
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,917.774	2,142.703	576.097
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Predictors of Switching to Trump (Lived in county more than 5 years)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.080***	2.377***	1.727***
	(0.242)	(0.223)	(0.428)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.004***	0.002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.003*	−0.0001	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Racial Resentment	3.243***	3.070***	2.732***
	(0.400)	(0.341)	(0.750)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.789***	1.047***	0.855
	(0.340)	(0.298)	(0.561)
Relative Deprivation	0.330	−0.110	0.362
	(0.235)	(0.205)	(0.411)
Unemployed	0.373	0.263	0.321
	(0.350)	(0.323)	(0.705)
Family Income (low-high)	0.094**	0.016	0.103
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.080)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.008	−0.004	−0.010
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.004**	0.0005	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	0.073	0.110	−0.080
	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.183)
Female	−0.532***	0.363**	−0.066
	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.285)
Military HH	0.158	0.203	−0.127
	(0.191)	(0.170)	(0.351)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.476***	0.585***	0.244
	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.169)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.305***	0.238***	0.374***
	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.140)
Born-Again	0.504***	0.340*	−0.175
	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.311)
South	−0.008	0.357**	0.296
	(0.200)	(0.167)	(0.333)
Rural	0.181	0.262	−0.350
	(0.188)	(0.165)	(0.324)
Constant	−8.268***	−6.870***	−3.793***
	(0.641)	(0.575)	(1.060)
Observations	3,337	1,836	383
Log Likelihood	−659.144	−740.862	−191.048
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,356.288	1,519.724	420.097
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Predictors of WWC Shifting to Trump in 2016 (Lived in county more less than 5 years)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.080***	2.377***	1.727***
	(0.242)	(0.223)	(0.428)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.004***	0.002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.003*	−0.0001	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Racial Resentment	3.243***	3.070***	2.732***
	(0.400)	(0.341)	(0.750)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.789***	1.047***	0.855
	(0.340)	(0.298)	(0.561)
Relative Deprivation	0.330	−0.110	0.362
	(0.235)	(0.205)	(0.411)
Unemployed	0.373	0.263	0.321
	(0.350)	(0.323)	(0.705)
Family Income (low-high)	0.094**	0.016	0.103
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.080)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.008	−0.004	−0.010
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.004**	0.0005	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	0.073	0.110	−0.080
	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.183)
Female	−0.532***	0.363**	−0.066
	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.285)
Military HH	0.158	0.203	−0.127
	(0.191)	(0.170)	(0.351)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.476***	0.585***	0.244
	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.169)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.305***	0.238***	0.374***
	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.140)
Born-Again	0.504***	0.340*	−0.175
	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.311)
South	−0.008	0.357**	0.296
	(0.200)	(0.167)	(0.333)
Rural	0.181	0.262	−0.350
	(0.188)	(0.165)	(0.324)
Constant	−8.268***	−6.870***	−3.793***
	(0.641)	(0.575)	(1.060)
Observations	3,337	1,836	383
Log Likelihood	−659.144	−740.862	−191.048
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,356.288	1,519.724	420.097
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Predictors of Switching to Trump (Latino pop growth and size)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.123***	2.218***	1.976***
	(0.200)	(0.184)	(0.360)
Percent Hispanic	−0.002	0.012**	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003**	0.002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	−0.003*	0.002	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Racial Resentment	3.180***	3.221***	2.544***
	(0.333)	(0.285)	(0.624)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.783***	1.159***	1.546***
	(0.275)	(0.236)	(0.466)
Relative Deprivation	0.296	−0.215	−0.024
	(0.198)	(0.174)	(0.338)
Unemployed	0.455	0.056	0.250
	(0.281)	(0.278)	(0.601)
Family Income (low-high)	0.085**	−0.005	0.045
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.064)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.010*	−0.003	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.003**	0.003**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.074	0.098	0.042
	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.160)
Female	−0.393***	0.429***	−0.253
	(0.133)	(0.121)	(0.240)
Military HH	0.279*	0.266*	−0.651**
	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.289)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.490***	0.572***	0.229
	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.142)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.243***	0.215***	0.333***
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.115)
Born-Again	0.481***	0.270*	−0.098
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.260)
South	−0.056	0.189	0.180
	(0.168)	(0.141)	(0.275)
Rural	0.266*	0.334**	−0.248
	(0.157)	(0.142)	(0.283)
Constant	−7.755***	−6.996***	−3.459***
	(0.531)	(0.485)	(0.894)
Observations	4,629	2,671	548
Log Likelihood	−939.224	−1,049.387	−269.456
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,918.448	2,138.774	578.911
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Predictors of Switching to Trump (WWC defined as low income)

	Dependent variable:		
	vote_trump		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.109***	2.277***	2.284***
	(0.276)	(0.248)	(0.509)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.001	0.001	−0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.0004	0.001	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Racial Resentment	3.226***	2.780***	1.587*
	(0.457)	(0.390)	(0.853)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	2.089***	1.116***	1.479**
	(0.380)	(0.313)	(0.657)
Relative Deprivation	0.769	−0.394	0.039
	(0.483)	(0.384)	(0.781)
Unemployed	0.007	0.261	0.185
	(0.349)	(0.318)	(0.668)
Family Income (low-high)	0.167*	−0.090	−0.169
	(0.097)	(0.084)	(0.171)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.008	−0.003	−0.013
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.001	0.002	0.00002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Union (no, was, is)	−0.095	0.099	−0.130
	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.263)
Female	−0.409**	0.316*	−0.679*
	(0.188)	(0.167)	(0.382)
Military HH	0.028	0.249	−0.781*
	(0.252)	(0.203)	(0.442)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.594***	0.558***	0.361
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.227)
Religion Important (none-lot)	0.232**	0.214***	0.321*
	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.183)
Born-Again	0.589***	0.473**	0.100
	(0.208)	(0.204)	(0.371)
South	−0.020	0.487***	0.716*
	(0.224)	(0.181)	(0.411)
Rural	0.563***	0.322*	0.082
	(0.204)	(0.180)	(0.375)
Constant	−9.097***	−6.197***	−2.685*
	(0.883)	(0.708)	(1.469)
Observations	2,499	1,535	267
Log Likelihood	−480.607	−553.648	−134.329
Akaike Inf. Crit.	999.214	1,145.295	306.659
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Predictors of Switching to Trump (Pooled RAND Sample)

	Dependent variable:
	voted_trump
	WWC Pooled
Anti-Immigrant Scale	2.105***
	(0.403)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.0003
	(0.0004)
Racial Resentment	2.143***
	(0.444)
Personal Econ Situation Worse	1.556***
	(0.262)
Unemployed	0.173
	(0.241)
Income < 25k	0.576
	(0.433)
Income 25k-50k	0.839**
	(0.397)
Income 50k-75k	1.121***
	(0.411)
Income 75k-100k	0.485
	(0.536)
Female	0.141
	(0.242)
South	1.198***
	(0.264)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.001
	(0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	−0.005**
	(0.002)
Rural	0.349
	(0.257)
Constant	−4.557***
	(0.584)
Observations	548
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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